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COMMENTARY: BRADY, BRADY,
WHEREFORE ART THOU BRADYV?*
Michael J. Benzat
A long time ago, in a social and political climate far, far away, the
Supreme Court of the United States made a promise to the People.
The promise was that prosecutors would place fairness and procedure
over obtaining convictions. To ensure that criminal trials were both
fair and just, the state would turn over to every defendant exculpatory,
impeachment and mitigating evidence. This promise was made, not
because it was a nice thing to do, but because the Constitution
mandated such a promise. The problem has come, however, in giving
fruit to that promise.
It has been over forty years since the Court announced its decision
in Brady v. Maryland.' The Court proclaimed in sweeping terms that
our "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. ''2 This was not a novel
or ground-breaking proclamation. In fact, the Court previously and
continually emphasized the special role prosecutors play in the
criminal justice system. The public prosecutor:
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
" This article should be read in conjunction with Bennett L. Gershman's exploration of
Brady, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutor's Play to Avoid Compliance, presented
and published in this symposium. This article is an attempt to present one real example of the
trials and tribulations of giving effect to the promise of Brady.
t Distinguished Practitioner of Law and Adjunct Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 Id. at 87.
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innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about ajust one.3
"The function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not
to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function
is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give
those accused of crime a fair trial."4 It is this special role that
mandates a duality of duty. Prosecutors must seek to convict the
guilty while at the same time ensuring that the process of criminal
proceedings remain fair.' Because of this unique role, fundamental
fairness or due process requires that prosecutors disclose exculpatory,
mitigation or impeachment evidence. While this is fine rhetoric and a
noble concept, the reality of conformity with Brady, and hence, the
Constitution, falls far short of these ideals.
The shortcomings are best seen through the Supreme Court's
recent foray into applying Brady: Banks v. Dretke.6 In Banks, Delma
Banks was charged with capital murder in Texas. At trial, two key
witnesses, Cook and Farr, gave testimony that connected Banks to the
murder weapon and testified that Banks confessed to the murder.7
Both of these key witnesses directly gave testimony bolstering their
credibility. Defense counsel specifically cross-examined Cook and
Farr about prior statements and benefits for testimony.8 Cook, the
witness who claimed Banks confessed to him and turned the murder
weapon over to police, testified that he did not talk to anyone about
his testimony. 9 Farr, who corroborated Cook's testimony about
Banks's activities in the days after the murder, denied receiving
money from police officers, being offered anything in exchange for
his testimony, or giving prior statements about the Banks case.l°
Based primarily on this testimony, Banks was convicted and
sentenced to death." This appears to be a straight-forward trial and
3 United States v. Burger, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
4 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-649 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5 See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); Brady, 540 U.S. at 87.
6 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
7 ld at 677.
8 Id.
9 Id.
'0 Id. at 678.
' Id. at 674.
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subsequent conviction. In fact, the defense presented no evidence to
rebut the State's case.
12
The problem is that the prosecutors failed to comply with their
obligations under Brady and withheld evidence from the defense. 3 As
the history of litigation in Banks demonstrates, enforcement of Brady
obligations is virtually impossible and therefore results in a right
without a remedy. The Brady violations in Banks began before trial
and continued through habeas proceedings. Prior to trial, the
prosecutor informed Banks's attorney that the State would "provide
you with all discovery to which you are entitled."' 4 In spite of being
entitled to rely on this representation,' 5 Banks's counsel specifically
asked Cook and Farr about potential Brady material and was
rebuffed.' 6 Because the prosecutors failed to reveal the materials
demonstrating that Cook and Farr were committing perjury, Banks
was unable to challenge their testimony and the jury was deprived of
critical evidence on which to make credibility and substantive factual
decisions. The prosecutor vouched for Cook's and Farr's
unchallenged testimony in closing argument, specifically stating that
"Cook brought you absolute truth,"' 7 and that Farr was truthful
because he admitted to using drugs.
18
The violation continued in state post-conviction proceedings.
Banks's petition "alleged 'upon information and belief that 'the
prosecution knowingly failed to turn over exculpatory evidence as
required by [Brady]."' 9 Banks directly challenged Farr's denial of
being a police informant and suppression of a deal between the
prosecutors and Cook.2° In support of this petition Banks submitted
an unsigned affidavit.
21
The State responded to the petition with direct denials of the
allegations, specifically stating "[n]othing was kept secret from the
defense. 22 The prosecutors and lead investigating sheriff deputy
submitted affidavits in support of this assertion.23 In rejecting Banks's
petition, the state court directly held that "'there was no agreement
12 Banks, 540 U.S. at 679.
13 Id. at 675.
14 Id. at 677.
"S See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.
16 Banks, 540 U.S. at 692.
17 Id. at 678.
" Id. at 681.
'9 Id. at 682.
20 Id.
21 id.
2' Banks, 540 U.S. at 683.
23 Id. The affidavits were noticeably silent about Farr but contained express denials about
Cook. Id.
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between the State and the witness Charles Cook' but made no
findings concerning Farr.
24
Banks then proceeded to federal court.25 His initial discovery
request was granted in part and he was allowed limited discovery into
issues surrounding Cook, but no discovery was permitted as to Farr.26
Banks then renewed his discovery motion after obtaining affidavits
from Cook and Farr rebutting their trial testimony. Based on this
newly discovered evidence, the federal court ordered disclosure of the
prosecutors' files and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.27
Through this disclosure, Banks discovered a seventy-four page
transcript of a preparation session between the prosecutor and Cook.28
Throughout the transcript the prosecutor directed Cook how to answer
questions and shore up his credibility. 29 This clearly contradicted
Cook's trial testimony that he never spoke with anyone about his
testimony. At the evidentiary hearing, Deputy Sheriff Huff, for the
first time, admitted that Farr was a police informant and had been
paid for his work in the Banks case directly contrary to Farr's trial
testimony.30  Based on this material the Magistrate Judge
recommended a granting of the Writ as to the death sentence because
of evidence regarding Farr.31 The Magistrate Judge denied relief as to
the evidence regarding Cook because there was no evidence of a deal
between Cook and the prosecutors.32 The District Court concurred
and the Writ was issued only as to the Brady violation relating to
Farr.33 The District Court determined that the issues surrounding
Cook were different Brady violations than the ones raised in the
habeas petition and were therefore unreviewable.34
If the case ended here it would simply be a "typical" Brady case
demonstrating the difficulty, if not near impossibility, of giving
proper force to Brady's Constitutional mandate. After all, the
prosecutors committed the initial Brady violation in pre-trial
proceedings in 1980. The actual evidence of the violation was not
discovered in 1980 during the trial, nor during the two years the case
was on direct appeal, nor during the three state post-conviction
24 id.
25 id.
26 Banks, 540 U.S. at 684.
27 Id, at 685.
28 Id
29 id.
30 id.
31 Id. at 686.
32 Banks, 540 U.S. at 686.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 687.
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petitions litigated between 1984 and 1996, but rather, during habeas
proceedings initiated in 1996. 35 Even then the material was not
disclosed until 1999.36 Had the Magistrate Judge not ordered
discovery, had Delma Banks not been represented by George Kendall,
with the resources of the law firm of Holland & Knight at his
disposal, had the prosecutors not maintained evidence of their
misconduct (or continued the misconduct by refusing to comply with
the discovery order), had Deputy Sheriff Huff perjured himself by
continuing to deny the relationship with Farr, or had any other
random event that lead to disclosure of the evidence not happened,
Delma Banks would have been executed and the world would be none
the wiser of the errors that permeated the case.
But, the case did not end here. Instead, the matter proceeded on
appeal to the Fifth Circuit.37 The Fifth Circuit agreed that the
prosecutors suppressed Farr's status as a police informant. However,
the Court determined that Banks was not diligent in pursuing this
claim and was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in habeas.38
Because he was not entitled to a hearing the evidence developed in
habeas proceedings was procedurally barred.39 That is, the federal
courts were obliged to ignore its existence. As for the Cook training
session transcript claim, the Circuit refused to even permit that issue
to be appealed.40 Had the case ended there it would still simply be a
"typical" habeas case in which a death row inmate's failure to
properly litigate his case was to blame for the denial of relief. In fact,
because the Circuit reversed the grant of the Writ, the state of Texas
set Banks's execution for March 12, 2003. 4' That day could easily
have come to pass with barely a ripple caused by the execution of
Delma Banks.
But, the case did not end there. On March 12, 2003, the day of the
execution, and with Banks about ten minutes from execution, the
Supreme Court of the United States issued a stay of execution to
consider Banks's petition for a writ of certiorari.4 2 The petition was
" Id. at 683.
'6 Id. at 684.
Ild. at 687.
38 Banks, 540 U.S. at 688.39 id.
40 Id. at 689.
41 This date was set in spite of the fact that a petition for a writ of certiorari was pending
before the Supreme Court of the United States. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Banks, 540 U.S.
668 (No. 02-8286).
42 Banks v. Cockrell, 538 U.S. 917 (2003).
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subsequently granted and the Court agreed to review the Brady issues
as to both Farr and Cook.43
The first issue the Court addressed was whether Banks could raise
the claims in habeas proceedings. 44 During oral argument the
following exchange took place:
QUESTION: So the prosecution can lie and conceal and the
prisoner still has the burden to - to discover the evidence?
That's your position?
MS. BUNN: Yes, Your Honor, because in a case like this,
unlike Strickler, unlike Amadeo, this is more like - more like
McCleskey, where the nondisclosure, whether in trial court or
in state habeas, did not prevent the petitioner from developing
the claim.
45
The dialogue continued:
QUESTION: No, but you are - are - aren't you arguing, just
as Justice Kennedy suggested, that what they should have
done in this case is to go to the court and say, we want further
resources to investigate, and what specifically we want to
investigate is an issue which, if we are correct, the state is
affirmatively lying about. We want investigative resources to
prove that state's counsel is lying. Isn't that your position?
MS. BUNN: Well, yes, Your Honor -
QUESTION: And for failure to do that -
MS. BUNN: - that would be -
QUESTION: - for failure to do that, they're out. Isn't that
your position?
MS. BUNN: That is part of our position.
46
The Court ultimately rejected this argument and affirmed the duty
of prosecutors to reveal Brady material.47 However, what this
dialogue demonstrates is the underlying flaws in applying Brady.
Brady imposes a duty of disclosure, but the risks for failing this duty
43 Id.
4 Banks, 540 U.S. at 690-698.
45 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (No. 02-8286).
4 Id. at 37.
47 Banks, 540 U.S. at 695, 698.
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are negligible and the risks of getting caught are even smaller. At
trial, when the Brady violation has its greatest impact, a prosecutor
simply asserts compliance with Brady and that presumptively
demonstrates compliance. 48 Because of this presumption, there is no
risk of discovery as defense counsel has no incentive, in fact, no
grounds, to investigate for Brady material. The failure to disclose
directly leads to a failure to investigate and therefore to discover and
prove a Brady violation. The case then proceeds to trial and a
conviction is obtained.
If the defendant is fortunate enough to have resources, or is
sentenced to death and therefore has a greater likelihood of further
review, the case may proceed to state post-conviction litigation.
However, absent some fortuitous event leading to a good faith belief
that a Brady violation occurred, the claim cannot be raised let alone
developed. Unless evidence contrary to the prosecutor's trial
declaration of compliance is discovered, a Brady claim would assert
that a violation occurred because the prosecutor must have lied. When
pressed for proof of this claim the defendant would simply shrug his
shoulders and say "I can't prove it because the prosecutor continues
to hide the evidence." The claim would be denied, as in Banks, if the
prosecutor simply responded "Nothing was hidden." Since the
presumption of compliance continues to hold sway, the court has no
option but to deny the claim. To hold otherwise would require the
court to find that, in spite of no evidence to support it, the prosecutors
lied and continue to lie. Since no court is going to engage in that sort
of logic, there is no real risk that the Brady violation will be
discovered in state post-conviction.
If, after exhausting this avenue, the defendant still has resources,
or is still under a sentence of death, the matter may proceed to habeas
review. The defendant again has the uphill battle of arguing, let alone
proving, a Brady violation in the face of the ongoing prosecutorial
assertions of compliance. Not only must the defendant overcome the
presumption of compliance, he must also satisfy the restrictive
discovery procedures of Habeas Rule 6 and the standards of review in
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e)(1) and (2). Once again, this requires the
habeas court to overcome the presumption of compliance, without
any evidence, to support that conclusion.
This quagmire was exactly what Banks was forced to slog through.
Throughout the proceedings, the State asserted compliance with the
Constitution and Brady, denied the existence of any evidence,
affirmatively mislead Banks and the courts and, when caught,
4 See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 286-87; Banks, 540 U.S. at 698.
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transferred the blame to Banks for failing to catch the misconduct
earlier. For whatever reason, be it that the case dragged on long
enough, the heretofore unknown cracks in the State's wall of deceit
began to show, or as simple and blind luck would have it, the habeas
court permitted discovery, the presumption of compliance was
rebutted and the Brady violations were proved. If this is the path of a
"typical" Brady claim, and I submit that the path is even though the
ultimate outcome is not, prosecutors run a near zero risk of discovery
of a Brady violation.
What is lost in the shuffle of this case is that, but for the Court
granting review of Banks's case, Banks would have died on March
12, 2003, and the prosecutors would have obtained their objective:
Banks's execution.49 At that point, any interest in enforcing Brady,
and any risk of repercussions to the prosecutors, would have died
with him. As the tortured history of the case demonstrates, Delma
Banks did not discover the Brady violation because the system
worked, but found the violation in spite of the system. The real quest
of Brady, and for the courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
society, is to give effect to the lofty promise the Constitution and the
Court made so long ago. Until the courts take affirmative steps to
seek out, review, and redress Brady violations, prosecutors bear
almost no cost for failing their Constitutional obligations. And, as the
Court so aptly recognized all those years ago, our society continues to
lose so long as the process by which convictions are obtained is
tainted by the specter of Brady violations. The questions really are:
how many more Delma Banks are out there, and how are the courts
going to reclaim criminal trials as quests for truth and repudiate the
atmosphere of gamesmanship and victory at any cost that now
permeates the criminal justice system? Until these questions are
answered the promise of Brady remains empty, and "justice" becomes
a prosecutor's game, one played fairly only if the prosecutor so
chooses.
49 Banks might now be a minor footnote in the history of the modem death penalty as the
300th execution. See Supreme Court Stays Texas 300 Execution, http://lmtonline.com/news/
archive/031303/pagea6.pdf.
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